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Introduction
Family business researchers contend that family firms
are more likely to pursue nonfinancial goals than non-
family firms (e.g., Chrisman et al. 2003). Gómez-Mejía
et al. (2001, 2007, 2003, 2010) further suggest that
the ability to achieve nonfinancial goals provides fam-
ily owners with socioemotional wealth, whereas other
researchers (e.g., Zellweger and Astrachan 2008) refer
to emotional value to make the same point. Gómez-
Mejía and his colleagues show empirically that a desire
to preserve socioemotional wealth can lead to entrench-
ment (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2001), reduced compensation
risk for family executives (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2003),
a preference to preserve family control even when that
increases business risk (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007), a ten-
dency to avoid diversification that might reduce firm
risk but increase control risk (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2010),
and better environmental performance when that pro-
tects against risks to the family’s reputation (Berrone
et al. 2010).
The idea that family members attach socioemotional
wealth to firm ownership has theoretical relevance, and
Gómez-Mejía and his colleagues (Berrone et al. 2010;
Gómez-Mejía et al. 2001, 2003, 2007, 2010) have pro-
vided strong indirect evidence of the existence and
influence of socioemotional wealth in family firms.
However, there are conceptual and empirical issues that
still need to be examined. For example, the concept still
needs to be tested more directly.
Conceptually, the family’s control of the firm through
ownership is critical to creating and preserving socio-
emotional wealth because such control is what allows
the family to pursue its interests through the firm. In
other words, control is a necessary condition and plays
a critical role in the theory of socioemotional wealth.
Researchers (e.g., Berrone et al. 2010, Gómez-Mejía
et al. 2007) have observed, however, that the influence of
socioemotional wealth varies among family firms with
seemingly similar ownership and control characteristics.
Our study addresses the need to understand this varia-
tion in socioemotional wealth’s influence on family firm
behavior. By showing that socioemotional wealth exists
and is measurable, our study provides a critical step
toward establishing a direct instead of imputed linkage
between noneconomic goals and family firm behavior,
and thus it advances family firm theory.
Specifically, this study develops and tests hypotheses
on the relationship between family control and socio-
emotional wealth. We argue that the observed variation
in the influence socioemotional wealth exerts on family
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firm behavior may arise from differences among family
firms with respect to aspects of firm control. We focus
on how three aspects of control—the extent of current
control, the length of time or duration of control, and the
intention for transgenerational control—are believed to
affect socioemotional wealth. Current control is impor-
tant because without it, the family chief executive offi-
cer (CEO) would not have the power and legitimacy
to make decisions based on nonfinancial criteria. Like-
wise, duration of control is important because, over time,
socioemotional wealth can increase through the heirloom
effect and as the family firm becomes the depository
of univocal reciprocity (Janjuha-Jivraj and Spence 2009,
Wade-Benzoni 2002). Finally, transgenerational control
is important because it influences whether socioemo-
tional benefits such as the perpetuation of the family
dynasty and continuation of family values are feasi-
ble. More importantly, the intention for transgenerational
control of the firm influences the controlling family’s
vision for the business and its goals for socioemotional
wealth creation and preservation.
Following the family firm socioemotional wealth
literature (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007, Astrachan
and Jaskiewicz 2008, Shepherd and Zacharakis 2000,
Zellweger and Astrachan 2008), we developed our
hypotheses using prospect theory and test these hypothe-
ses using data from surveys of family firm CEOs in
two different countries. We contribute to the literature
by developing a theoretical explanation for why differ-
ent aspects of control might influence socioemotional
wealth and by empirically demonstrating that intention
for transgenerational control of the firm is a primary
driver of the socioemotional wealth perceptions of fam-
ily firm owners. This is important to the theory of fam-
ily business because socioemotional wealth and inten-
tion for transgenerational control have been treated as
separate factors that differentiate family from nonfam-
ily firms. Our study, in effect, provides evidence that
transgenerational control intentions influence socioemo-
tional wealth, suggesting that the two are complemen-
tary rather than alternative explanations for variations
among family firms and, by implication, differences
between family and nonfamily firms. We also contribute
to the family firm literature by demonstrating that such
wealth is quantifiable and that intentions for transgen-
erational control can be directly linked to variations in
family firm behavior—in this case, firm valuations.
Theory Development
Before developing our hypotheses about how the three
aspects of family firm control affect the socioemotional
wealth perceived by the families, it is first necessary
to briefly discuss the factors that influence the financial
value of a firm.
Financial Value of a Firm
It is commonly understood, as any introductory finance
textbook would state, that the financial value of a firm is
theoretically equal to the present value of the expected
future cash flows to the owners. Technically speak-
ing, the present value is determined by discounting the
expected future cash flows at an appropriate discount
rate that increases with risk. Thus, the financial value of
the firm should increase with cash flows, increase with
the growth and sustainability of cash flows, and decrease
with risk.
In addition to cash-flow value, however, the literature
also provides evidence that the dominant coalition may
be able to extract additional value from firm ownership
at the expense of the other shareholders by consuming
perks, investing in projects that increase the power of
owners and managers rather than financial returns, shap-
ing dividend policy to favor the coalition, and entrench-
ing or overpaying management (e.g., Combs et al. 2010,
Morck et al. 1988, Villalonga and Amit 2006). These
so-called private benefits have been well documented for
firms with concentrated ownership in countries around
the world (Nenova 2003). What financial research has
therefore shown is that the shares held by the dominant
coalition (whether it is composed of family members or
not) can have a greater value than what is reflected in
their percentage of ownership.
In summary, the finance literature suggests that a
firm’s financial value has two components that apply to
both family and nonfamily firms: cash-flow value and
the private benefits that are available when the firm has
concentrated ownership (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
Prospect Theory and the Financial Value of
Socioemotional Wealth
Behavioral theorists have long suggested that firms have
economic goals as well as a variety of noneconomic
ones that reflect the perceptions, values, attitudes, and
intentions of the coalitions in the organization (Argote
and Greve 2007, Cyert and March 1963). In family
firms, where the dominant coalition is controlled by fam-
ily members, it seems likely that noneconomic goals
related to the family itself would be especially important
(Westhead and Howorth 2007). Recent developments,
consistent with the behavioral tradition, propose that the
pursuance of these family-centered noneconomic goals
create emotional value (e.g., Astrachan and Jaskiewicz
2008, Zellweger and Astrachan 2008) or socioemotional
wealth (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007) for the family. As
conceptualized, socioemotional wealth includes fulfilling
needs for belonging, affect, and intimacy; continuation
of family values through the firm; perpetuation of the
family dynasty; preservation of family firm social capi-
tal; discharge of family obligations based on blood ties;
ability to act altruistically toward family members using
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firm resources (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007); and social sta-
tus (Zellweger and Astrachan 2008). These benefits dif-
fer from the private benefits discussed and documented
in the finance literature because they are not necessarily
obtained at the expense of other shareholders (Burkart
et al. 2003).
Economists observe that individuals tend to evaluate
the possible outcomes of their decisions relative to the
status quo, for example, by considering the marginal
benefits and costs of actions relative to the do-nothing
scenario. In the particular case of decisions concern-
ing possessions, this leads to the perception that part-
ing with an asset constitutes a loss. If the parting is in
exchange for something of equal financial value, there
should be no net gain or loss from a financial point
of view. However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979a) and
Tversky and Kahneman (1986, 1991) observe that loss
aversion makes decision makers attach greater weight to
an asset’s loss than to the financially equivalent gain,
causing the minimum price that an individual demands
for parting with an asset to be higher than the maximum
price that individual is willing to pay to acquire the same
asset (Kahneman et al. 1990, 1991; Thaler 1980). The
general existence of this additional perceived financial
value arising from the endowment effect is well docu-
mented by researchers across various disciplines (e.g.,
Boyce et al. 1992, Curasi et al. 2004, Kahneman et al.
1991, Price et al. 2000, Schultz Kleine and Menzel-
Baker 2004). The effect has also been shown to persist
in a variety of settings (Kahneman et al. 1990).
This has two important implications for theory. First,
if family firm control provides and is a necessary condi-
tion for a socioemotional endowment, then parting with
control means losing the endowment. Prospect theory
therefore suggests that loss aversion would make the
family reluctant to sell the firm for only its financial
value. In other words, following the logic of behavioral
agency theory (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007, Wiseman and
Gómez-Mejía 1998), once family owners adopt a socio-
emotional reference point rather than a purely financial
reference point, their perceptions of the value of the firm
should rise according to the amount of socioemotional
wealth they attach to the firm.
Second, because endowments can be perceived to
have financial value, the family should be willing to
trade socioemotional wealth for an appropriate financial
consideration (Astrachan and Jaskiewicz 2008, Gómez-
Mejía et al. 2010, Zellweger and Astrachan 2008), sug-
gesting that socioemotional wealth may be measurable
in financial terms. If we define the total perceived value
of the firm to the controlling family to be the price at
which the family would be willing to sell the entire busi-
ness to nonfamily members, it should then be equal to
the financial value based on cash-flow and private ben-
efits plus the additional value for which the family is
willing to give up its socioemotional wealth endowment.
Thus, it should be possible to measure socioemotional
value or wealth as the difference between the controlling
family’s perceived total value of the firm and the sum of
its cash-flow- and private-benefit-based financial value.1
Extent of Existing Ownership Control
Control is a necessary condition for the family to pos-
sess socioemotional wealth through the family business
because without it the family would not have the legiti-
macy and power to manage the firm in the particularistic
manner required to generate that wealth. Thus, the body
of work by Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007, 2010) that pro-
vides us with the dominant portion of the evidence about
socioemotional wealth ensures that the families studied
had ownership control, and indeed those authors argue
that obtaining socioemotional wealth is only possible
through control. As Berrone et al. (2010) and Gómez-
Mejía et al. (2007) observe, however, family firms with
similar family ownership and control appear to behave
with substantial unexplained heterogeneity, suggesting
that the importance of socioemotional wealth varies.
Explaining the heterogeneity is important for the the-
ory of socioemotional wealth and the theory of the
family firm because of socioemotional wealth’s role in
explaining differences between family and nonfamily
firms, and especially variation among family firms. To
develop an explanation, we focus on how families may
differ in the ways they satisfy the condition of control
through the extent of current control, the duration of
family control, and the family’s intentions for transgen-
erational control.
Without existing control, the family cannot receive
the benefits flowing from socioemotional wealth. Indeed,
the family’s emotional ties to the firm are likely to
strengthen with control (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2003). If
true, then the socioemotional wealth endowment derived
from the emotional benefits arising from, for exam-
ple, fulfillment of belonging, affect, and intimacy should
increase with control. Socioemotional wealth should also
strengthen with the extent of control through ownership
because, in our politicoeconomic system, property rights
provide controlling owners with the power to act in a
particularistic manner (Carney 2005) even if that mainly
reflects the values and aspirations of the owners. The
more of the business the family owns, the greater the
family’s power to act in ways that increase its socioemo-
tional wealth and the greater the perceived loss if control
were relinquished.
In addition, socioemotional wealth should intensify
with the extent of control through ownership as a
result of enhanced reputation, status, and social capi-
tal. As control of the firm increases, the association of
the family’s name with the firm increases (Dyer and
Whetten 2006). Thus, increased control heightens both
the legitimacy and importance of the family’s pursuit
of socioemotional wealth. Furthermore, some sources of
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socioemotional wealth, such as social status and family
social capital, may be affected significantly by whether
the family is perceived to be imposing agency costs on
the firm’s other stakeholders, such as by altruistically
hiring less competent family members or overcompen-
sating them (cf. Chua et al. 2009). However, the more
of the business the family owns, the more the cost of
particularistic behavior will be borne by the family and
the less likely its reputation, social status, or social cap-
ital will be reduced by conflicts with nonfamily own-
ers. Therefore, the legitimacy of a family’s decisions in
the eyes of other stakeholders should be enhanced by
increasing ownership, and this will in turn increase the
family’s socioemotional wealth and its perceptions of the
value of the firm.
In summary, for power and legitimacy reasons, the
extent of the family’s ownership control should posi-
tively affect socioemotional wealth. As expressed below,
this suggests that as family ownership increases, loss-
averse family owners will demand a higher price to relin-
quish their socioemotional wealth; therefore, they will
perceive the total value of the firm to be higher.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). There is a positive relationship
between the extent of family ownership and family own-
ers’ perceptions of the total value of the firm’s equity.
Duration of Control
The socioemotional endowments tied to ownership can
occur instantaneously (Kahneman et al. 1991). How-
ever, research suggests that a value premium associated
with ownership may also grow over time as a result of
extended self-attribution (Belk 1988, Boyce et al. 1992,
Watson 1992) and increasing preference for the status
quo with experience (Burmeister and Schade 2007). The
marketing literature contains extensive evidence that the
perceived value of an asset to its owner can increase with
the duration of emotional attachment such that the per-
ceived value is higher than its financial value. Emotional
attachment first requires psychological appropriation—a
sense that the asset is “mine” (Belk 1992). In addition,
possession rituals over time give the owned asset a per-
sonal meaning that connects it with an individual (Belk
1988, Watson 1992), resulting in a perceived singularity
in the relationship between a person and an asset (Belk
1991, Grayson and Shulman 2000, Schultz Kleine et al.
1995). For example, research indicates that heirlooms
can become part of a family’s legacy or symbolize self-
continuity, and they thereby maintain affective meaning
across time (Price et al. 2000).
These studies have been conducted on inanimate
objects, but it is not unreasonable to draw parallels
with owners’ attachment to their firms. Through involve-
ment, owners may extend themselves into the firm just
as they may extend themselves into personal assets in
their possession (Belk 1988). Because emotional attach-
ment grows with time, the value of the family’s socioe-
motional wealth endowment should increase with the
duration of ownership. Indeed, behavioral theory sug-
gests that an increased attachment to the firm over time
will increase anticipated socioemotional wealth from
continuing firm ownership (cf. Cyert and March 1963,
Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía 1998).
Although it is reasonable to believe that the growth of
the endowment effect over time as a result of developing
emotional attachment is possible in both family and non-
family firms, it is more likely in the former because the
involvement of family links the firm to individuals with
which owners have close relationships. Indeed, many
of the attributes associated with socioemotional wealth
have a relational component, i.e., belonging, affect, inti-
macy, the ability to fulfill family obligations, and the
opportunity to behave altruistically toward kin (Gómez-
Mejía et al. 2007).
Furthermore, researchers (Janjuha-Jivraj and Spence
2009, Wade-Benzoni 2002) observe that reciprocity can
be univocal or of a generalized exchange type. Uni-
vocal reciprocity indicates that a member of a system
who contributes to the system will expect an eventual
payback even though its type, source, and timing may
be unspecified. To benefit from such reciprocity, how-
ever, system members must trust that the other members
of the system value their long-term relationships with
each other and will eventually reciprocate. This trust is
likely to exist among family members working in the
family firm because of the cultural norms and potential
sanctions that membership in a family imposes (Pollak
1985). That they will eventually be repaid by the sys-
tem should encourage such univocal reciprocity. Over
time, as the family firm accumulates more and more
potential payback benefits for all family members from
the univocal reciprocity behavior of family members, the
socioemotional wealth from control, especially that part
related to family members’ altruism and discharge of
family obligations, should increase.
However, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007, p. 109) argue and
present evidence that “losses in socioemotional wealth
should weigh less heavily on a family firm’s willing-
ness to give up control as it moves from stage one
[founding-family owned and managed firms] through
stage three [extended-family owned, professionally man-
aged firms].” This is not in conflict with the arguments
made above, though, because age does not always reflect
stage, and family firms do not always follow identical
sequences of development (Gersick et al. 1997). Thus,
if family involvement in management is held constant
(albeit potentially controlled by later generations), the
duration of ownership should increase perceptions of the
total value of the firm owing to the heirloom effect of
possession attachment rather than decrease them.
Zellweger et al.: Family Control and Family Firm Valuation by Family CEOs
Organization Science 23(3), pp. 851–868, © 2012 INFORMS 855
Based on the described effects, loss aversion, and the
potential to measure socioemotional wealth in financial
terms, we hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). There is a positive relationship
between the duration of family ownership and family
owners’ perceptions of the total value of the firm’s
equity.
Intentions for Transgenerational Control
Intention for transgenerational family control plays an
important role in the emerging theory of family busi-
ness both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually,
researchers have proposed it as the most important fea-
ture distinguishing family and nonfamily firms (e.g.,
Chua et al. 1999, Churchill and Hatten 1987). Empir-
ically, studies have shown that intrafamily succession
is the most important concern of family business own-
ers (Chua et al. 2003), is associated with family influ-
ence and commitment to the business (Holt et al. 2010),
and, directly relevant to this study, is an indicator of
the importance attached to family-centered nonfinancial
goals in family firms (Chrisman et al. 2012).
The intention is partly financial; family guardianship
may create a concern and commitment to preserve career
opportunities and the wealth-generating capabilities of
family assets for future generations (Curasi et al. 2004).
But the concern may have a personal, emotional element
as well if individuals see a part of themselves endur-
ing through the family’s continued possession of the
firm (Price et al. 2000). Furthermore, some components
of the family’s socioemotional wealth such as long-
term fulfillment of family obligations, preservation of the
family’s dynasty and values, and altruism toward family
members are contingent on the family’s control of the
business past the incumbent generation (Pollak 1985).
As shown by Chua et al. (2004), some family firms
are “born” with transgenerational control intentions. For
other firms such intentions are often triggered later in
their life cycles by precipitating events such as when
the owner becomes a parent, when a family member
becomes involved in the firm, or when an involved fam-
ily member expresses a desire to do so on a permanent
basis (Hoy and Verser 1994). Conversely, the absence of
family members able and willing to assume control can
erase such intentions (De Massis et al. 2008). Thus, the
effect of transgenerational control intentions on a family
firm’s perceived socioemotional wealth can be triggered
instantaneously, consistent with the endowment effect
proposed by prospect theory.
The extent of firm control indicates the family’s exist-
ing involvement and captures its ability to influence firm
decisions to provide socioemotional wealth to the fam-
ily. However, ability does not ensure that the family is
concerned with socioemotional wealth and will use its
influence to create and preserve it. The duration of con-
trol increases the tendency to do so, but of equal if not
greater importance is the family’s vision for how the
firm and the family will interact in the future and its
expectations about the types of value exchanges that will
flow from these future long-term interactions. Thus, a
vision for the future is critical in determining a family’s
concern and willingness to maintain its socioemotional
wealth through the pursuit of idiosyncratic strategies and
policies (Chrisman et al. 2003, Chua et al. 1999). In
turn, such a vision depends on transgenerational control
of the firm because it is through the continuing involve-
ment of family that the vision for future interactions can
be realized.
If owners have a vision for the firm that includes
intentions for transgenerational control, they are likely
to include socioemotional benefits that are feasible only
if the family maintains transgenerational control, such
as perpetuation of a family dynasty, in the calculation of
their current wealth. Behavioral theory predicts that this
will cause a change in the reference point that the fam-
ily uses to frame decisions (Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía
1998). In other words, an intention for transgenerational
control suggests that family owners count the future ben-
efits of control as part of their current socioemotional
wealth endowment. Selling the firm would then be
viewed as losing a socioemotional wealth endowment
that is made larger by the amount associated with trans-
generational control. Applying these arguments to our
assumption of loss aversion and the exchangeability of
socioemotional wealth for financial consideration then
leads logically to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). There is a positive relationship
between family owners’ intentions for transgenerational
control and their perceptions of the total value of the
firm’s equity.
Methods
We utilize two samples to test our hypothesis. The first
sample was obtained from a mailing list provided by a
family business center affiliated with a Swiss university.
A questionnaire was sent to the CEOs of 1,250 privately
held Swiss family firms in 2006. In 2007, questionnaires
were sent to a second sample of CEOs of 4,000 fam-
ily firms in Germany through a mailing list obtained
with the help of a major international accounting firm.2
To ensure that the firms in the two samples were fam-
ily firms, we verified that the firms on the mailing list
had identified themselves as family firms (e.g., Westhead
and Cowling 1998), the family held a controlling inter-
est, and the firm employed at least two family mem-
bers (e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns 2007, Eddleston
et al. 2008). Both studies were conducted in German.
Questionnaire items were taken from the English lit-
erature, where available, and translated into German.
An independent person then back-translated the German
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items into English to ensure consistency with the origi-
nal form. No inconsistency was discovered.
In common with other studies of family firms (e.g.,
Kellermanns et al. 2008), a key informant approach was
employed for both samples (Kumar et al. 1993, Seidler
1974) owing to our belief that family firm CEOs are the
primary decision makers. These individuals held signif-
icant personal ownership and had intimate knowledge
of the firm’s financial position and future prospects.3 In
all cases we ensured that the respondents used in the
study were CEOs, family members, and owners. As sug-
gested in the literature (e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns
2007), we also collected data from additional family
members employed in the firm for a subset of both sam-
ples (Switzerland, n= 40; Germany, n= 23) to validate
our multi-item constructs. For this subset, we calculated
the coefficient of agreement (rwg5 (James et al. 1984,
1993). We found the rwg values for both constructs used





which indicated that it was reasonable to rely on family
firm CEOs as the key informants (Eddleston et al. 2008).
We obtained 219 questionnaires from two mailings in
the Swiss sample, representing 179 distinct family firms
(179 CEOs and 40 additional family members). Thus,
our overall response rate was 14.3%. However, only
82 CEOs provided complete information, mostly owing
to the highly sensitive nature of the valuation question.
In the German sample, we obtained 349 responses after
three mailings, representing 326 distinct family firms
(326 CEOs and 23 other family members), resulting in
a response rate of 8.2%. This sample was also reduced
by nonresponse to the valuation question to only 148
CEOs. The response rates and missing data issues are
comparable to similar studies of family firms that rely
on primary sources for the collection of data that the
respondents would consider to be highly confidential
(e.g., Chrisman et al. 2004, Cruz et al. 2010, Gómez-
Mejía et al. 2003, Schulze et al. 2001). The sample sizes
are also comparable to studies of sales and buying prices
(see Horowitz and McConnell 2002). A post hoc power
analysis suggested that the power levels were acceptable
(Cohen 1988).
To explore the possibility of nonresponse bias, we com-
pared the data obtained from early (first mailing) and
late (second and third mailings) respondents using anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA). This test is based on the
assumption that late respondents are more similar to non-
respondents than early respondents (Chrisman et al. 2004,
Oppenheim 1966). No statistically significant differences
were found in either sample on any of the variables ana-
lyzed in this study, which at least partially mitigates non-
response concerns. We further conducted an ANOVA
between the respondents that answered all relevant ques-
tions for our study and the respondents who did not
respond to the question used to measure our dependent
variable. Here again, no significant differences emerged
in either sample for any of the variables.
We were able to further evaluate the representa-
tiveness of our samples through a comparison of the
respondents’ age, the firms’ age, and sales by industry
(construction and services, the two dominant industries
in our samples) of Swiss and German firms obtained
from the following national studies: the 2007 Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor’s (GEM) Swiss report (Volery
et al. 2007), the 2005 Swiss National Business Finance
(SNFB) Survey (Daeppen and Roth 2005), the GEM’s
German Report (Sternberg and Lückgen 2005), and the
German IfM study (Guenterberg 2007). As shown in
Table 1, these comparisons suggest that the firms in our
samples are older and slightly larger than the respon-
dents to the larger national studies. However, the respon-
dents themselves were similar in age. Based on these
comparisons, the greatest difference appeared to be that
the firms we studied are more likely to be owned by the
second or later generation of the family, whereas the
comparison samples were more likely to include first-
generation firms. The characteristics of our samples indi-
cate that our results may not generalize to younger
family firms.
The potential for multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity,
and common method bias were addressed for both sam-
ples. First, we found that the variance inflation fac-
tor did not exceed 1.65. Thus multicollinearity did not
appear to be a concern (Hair et al. 2006, Tabachnick and
Fidell 1996). Second, heteroscedasticity can sometimes
be a problem in valuation research. Accordingly, we
performed Levene tests between our independent vari-
ables and the regression residuals. Because none of the
tests was significant, heteroscedasticity did not appear
to be an issue (F ≤ 1080 for the German study, and
F ≤ 1024 for the Swiss study). Third, in addition to the
single-factor test for common method bias suggested by
Podsakoff and Organ (1986), which showed no concern,
we compared measurement models with method factor
models as recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003). The
results showed that the fit for the method factor models
(Swiss model, 241055= 6500151; comparative fix index
(CFI), 0.220; incremental fit index (IFI), 0.253; root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), 0.154;
German model, 241055 = 8290841; CFI, 0.287; IFI,
0.308; RMSEA, 0.141) were significantly worse than
the confirmatory factor analysis model. These models
showed acceptable fit levels considering the sample sizes
and the inclusion of the single-item indicators (Swiss
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Table 1 Comparison of Descriptive Statistics from GEM Swiss Report (Volery et al. 2007), GEM German Report
(Sternberg and Lückgen 2005), the SNBF Survey (Daeppen and Roth 2005), and the German IfM
Survey (Guenterberg 2007)
95% Confidence interval
Variable n Mean Lower bound Upper bound
Age of respondent
Swiss study 82 5101 4807 5305
German study 148 5106 4908 304
Swiss GEM data 21148 4505 4501 4509
German GEM data 678 4402 4305 4409
Age of firm
Swiss study: Construction 49 6802 5702 7902
Swiss study: Service 33 5608 4702 6604
German study: Construction 76 5500 4507 6403
German study: Service 72 4601 3605 5507
Swiss GEM data: Construction 550 1706 1704 1708
Swiss GEM data: Service 860 1508 1507 1509
German GEM data: Construction 250 1805 1803 1807
German GEM data: Service 322 1902 1900 1904
Salesa
Swiss study: Construction 49 50,840,225 45,775,025 55,905,425
Swiss study: Service 33 78,769,291 70,372,551 87,166,031
German study: Construction 76 122,000,000 91,445,954 152,554,046
German study: Service 72 38,100,000 36,004,706 40,195,294
SNBF data: Construction 529 46,732,000 45,027,652 48,436,348
SNBF data: Service 11619 28,260,000 27,042,209 29,477,791
IfM data: Construction 2771054 35,500,000 35,425,526 35,574,474
IfM data: Service 119111445 25,500,000 25,464,558 25,535,442
aFigures for Switzerland are in Swiss francs (exchange rate to USD at the time of study was USD 0.82/CHF 1); figures
for Germany are in euros (exchange rate to USD at the time of study was USD 1.32/EUR 1).
model, 241025 = 2200270; CFI, 0.831; IFI, 0.839;
RMSEA, 0.073; German model, 241015 = 2980270;
CFI, 0.807; IFI, 0.813; RMSEA, 0.074). Accordingly,
common method bias does not appear to be a problem
in our study.
Variables
The dependent variable was identical in both samples.
However, although similar, our control and independent
variables varied somewhat. This was a consequence of
somewhat different data collection goals as well as learn-
ing that occurred between the first study and the sec-
ond. Although the results are not perfectly comparable,
the differences in measures do serve to confirm the
robustness of our results. We discuss the common depen-
dent variable first and then the remaining variables.
Dependent Variable. The objective of our study is
to test whether socioemotional wealth influences family
owners’ perceptions of a firm’s total value. There is no
way to measure socioemotional wealth precisely with-
out actually performing individual valuations for each
firm and comparing this value with the value perceived
by owners. Instead, we test for the existence of socio-
emotional wealth by regressing the total perceived value
of the firm on our three measures of family control of
the firm, after controlling for the financial and nonfi-
nancial sources of value that are not unique to family
firms. Thus, our dependent variable is the family firm
owner-CEO’s total perceived value of the family firm.
Following previous approaches used to test the endow-
ment effect, we measure the acceptable sales price at the
owner level of analysis with a single-item question (e.g.,
Boyce et al. 1992, Carmon and Ariely 2000). In accor-
dance with recent guidelines pertaining to the wording
of the willingness to accept question (e.g., Zellweger and
Astrachan 2008), we asked the owner-CEOs of the sam-
ple firms, “What is the minimum acceptable sales price
at which you are willing to sell 100% of your company’s
equity to a nonfamily member?” This question made it
clear that we were looking for (1) the value of the firm’s
equity (2) when selling the entire firm (3) to parties out-
side the family. A pilot study of 29 entrepreneurs pro-
vided assurance that family firm owners understood the
question. The variable was characterized by high posi-
tive skewness and kurtosis (Hair et al. 2006). To achieve
a more normal distribution, we used the logarithm of
total perceived value in our analysis (Tabachnick and
Fidell 1996).
Independent Variables. We measured the extent of
family ownership by responses to a question asking
CEOs to indicate the percentage of the shares of the firm
owned by the CEO’s family.
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The duration of family ownership was measured by an
open-ended question about the age of the family firm.
This was appropriate because in all cases, the founding
families were still in control of the firms in the samples.
Age of the firm is also a useful proxy for the generation
of the family in control of the firm because founder-
controlled firms tend to be younger than successor-
controlled firms. However, as discussed earlier, although
firm age and firm stage are highly correlated, they are
not identical.
The primary drivers of intentions, according to
the psychology and entrepreneurship literatures, are
(1) opportunity or feasibility and (2) desire (Ajzen 1991,
Krueger 1993). Thus, we measured intentions for trans-
generational control using two items measured on a
seven-point Likert-type scale ( = 0083 for the Swiss
study, and  = 0070 for the German study) to capture
opportunity/feasibility and desire. For the first item, we
asked for agreement with the statement “The family
faces the opportunity to pass on the business to future
generations”; for the second, we asked for agreement
with the statement “Continuing the family legacy and
traditions is important to us.” The items were added and
the sum divided by the number of items to obtain the
final variable used.4
Financial Control Variables. Our financial control
variables included proxies for current cash flow, growth
and sustainability of performance, risk, and the private
benefits that the dominant coalition might extract from
the business. For both samples, we included cash-flow-
related controls.5 In the Swiss sample, we collected free
cash-flow data by asking the subjects, “What is the free
cash flow of your business (Profit + Noncash charges −
Investments)?” In the German sample, we collected
cash-flow data by asking, “What is the cash flow of your
business (Profit+Noncash charges)?” We chose the sec-
ond measure of cash flow in the German study to ensure
that our results were robust with respect to the definition
of cash flow used. Investments are not deducted in the
second measure; this guards against the possibility that
firm financial value may have increased with the invest-
ment despite a temporary decline in free cash flow. As
mentioned before, there was learning between the first
and the second survey.
Because the financial reports for these firms are pro-
fessionally audited and available to owners and CEOs,
we were confident our respondents had sufficient infor-
mation to respond to our questions about cash flows.
Indeed, we obtained objective data from the balance
sheets and income statements of 39 firms in the Swiss
sample as part of a benchmarking test. The correlation
between the free cash flows reported by respondents to
the survey with those from the benchmarking project
was 0.86, indicating high response quality and measure-
ment validity.
Because outperforming competitors is the surest guar-
antee of continued growth and sustainability, respon-
dents were asked to indicate whether their performance
in the last three years (past performance) was much
worse, about the same, or higher than competitors in
terms of (1) growth in sales, (2) growth in market share,
(3) return on equity, and (4) ability to fund growth from
profits (shortened from Eddleston et al. 2008). The per-
formance indicators were measured on a five-point scale
in the Swiss sample (= 0075) and a seven-point scale
in the German sample ( = 0082). Subjective perfor-
mance measures are often used in studies of privately
held firms where public information is lacking (Love
et al. 2002) and have been shown to correlate with objec-
tive performance data in family firms (e.g., Ling and
Kellermanns 2010).
Because of the difficulties in directly measuring risk
for privately held firms, three separate proxies were
used: size, industry, and investment risk. Risk tends to
decrease with firm size, which was measured by the
number of employees and transformed by the natu-
ral logarithm. Risk and, consequently, financial value
also tend to vary by industry. Firms were classified by
whether they competed in construction, services, or other
sectors of the economy. Two dummy variables repre-
senting firms in construction and service industries in
both samples were used to control for industry. Finally,
risk and returns can vary depending on the extent to
which family firms invest in risky projects. We assessed
the investment risk in both samples by asking subjects
to respond to the following question on a seven-point
scale: “Our family firm conducts investments that are
more risky than those of the competition.”
To control for the private benefits of concentrated
ownership, which are not unique to family firms, we
asked the respondents in the Swiss sample to rate on a
five-point Likert scale their agreement with the statement
“Family members derive attractive perks from the firm.”
In the German sample, we asked for the actual financial
benefit of perks received from the organization. Specifi-
cally, we asked, “How high were the additional financial
benefits that you obtain during one year through your
organization (e.g., car, travel, gas, mobile phone, etc.)?”
Because the latter values were skewed, we transformed
them using the natural logarithm.
Nonfinancial Control Variable. We also controlled for
the age of the CEO because that also might affect per-
ceptions of firm value (Zellweger and Astrachan 2008).
Individuals may form an attachment with a firm through
long-term association. For example, studies show that
incumbent leaders in family firms have problems letting
go owing to their emotional ties to the firm (Le Breton-
Miller et al. 2004).
Results
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations
of the Swiss and German samples are shown in Tables 2
Zellweger et al.: Family Control and Family Firm Valuation by Family CEOs
Organization Science 23(3), pp. 851–868, © 2012 INFORMS 859
Table 2 Correlation Matrix, Means, and Standard Deviations: Swiss Sample
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Free cash flow 2,215,686 3,932,339
2 Past performance 4080 1001 0024∗
3 Ln firm size (employees) 3071 1063 003∗∗ 0020†
4 Industry 1 (construction) 0031 0046 0020† 0022∗ 0013
5 Industry 2 (service) 0028 0045 0001 −0014 −0009 −0043∗∗∗
6 Investment risk 3088 1057 0007 0001 0034∗∗∗ −0006 −0009
7 Private benefits 3007 1066 −0028∗ 0006 −0027∗ −0006 0009 −0014
8 CEO age 51007 11032 0021† 0004 0015 0008 0007 0013 −0002
9 Family ownership 87087 24057 0007 0008 0006 −0004 0003 0007 −0012 0011
10. Duration of ownership/ 67003 34001 0024∗ −0014 0047∗∗∗ 0021∗ −0021∗ −0003 −0021† 0003 0011
firm age
11 Transgenerational 5007 1063 0022∗ 0004 0015 0011 0003 0017† 0002 −0006 −0001 0027∗
control intentions
12 Ln acceptable sales price 16009 2077 0049∗∗∗ 0024∗ 0058∗∗∗ 0003 0014 0035∗∗∗ −0033∗∗ 0016 0021† 0026∗ 0031∗∗∗
Notes. Figures are in Swiss francs (exchange rate to USD at the time of study was USD 0.82/CHF 1). N = 82.
†p < 0010; ∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001.
Table 3 Correlation Matrix, Means, and Standard Deviations: German Sample
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Current cash flow 2,227,853 6,119,088
2 Past performance 5028 0098 0014†
3 Ln firm size (employees) 4066 1007 0043∗∗∗ 0006
4 Industry 1 (construction) 0040 0049 0003 0001 0005
5 Industry 2 (service) 0027 0045 −0010 −0013 −0014† −0043∗∗∗
6 Investment risk 3084 1062 −0006 −0016∗ 0006 0010 −0011
7 Ln private benefits 10002 1006 0015† 0012 0002 0015† −0007 −0003
8 CEO age 51067 11027 0020∗ 0006 0012 0004 0003 −0010 0010
9 Family ownership 86083 25000 −0006 −0013 −0010 0006 −0002 0001 −0001 0003
10 Duration of ownership/ 48059 39043 0006 −0008 0017∗ 0014† −0020∗ 0015 0007 −0004 0029∗∗
firm age
11 Transgenerational 4085 1076 −0006 −0001 0004 0001 −0002 0013 0007 −0001 0019∗ 0030∗∗∗
control intentions
12 Ln acceptable sales price 15060 1023 0051∗∗∗ 0034∗∗∗ 0051∗∗∗ 0020∗ −0018∗ 0011 0015† 0003 −0002 0026∗∗∗ 0021∗
Notes. Figures are in euros (exchange rate to USD at the time of study was USD 1.32/EUR 1). N = 148.
†p < 0010; ∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001.
and 3, respectively. The hypotheses proposed in the
research model were tested using hierarchical multiple
regression analysis (see Tables 4 and 5). We entered the
control variables in Models 1 and 3 for the Swiss and
German samples, respectively. The independent vari-
ables were entered in Model 2 for the Swiss sample and
Model 4 for the German sample.
For the Swiss sample, Model 1 shows that family
owner-CEOs’ total perceived value of their family firms
is positively and significantly related to free cash flow
(p < 0001), size (p < 00001), the service industry vari-
able (p < 0005), and investment risk (p < 0005). Overall,
the adjusted R2 is 0.499, and the model is significant
(p < 00001). In Model 2 the adjusted R2 increases to
0.521 with the inclusion of the independent variables
(p < 00001). Neither the extent of family ownership nor
the duration of family ownership is significantly related
to the dependent variable. Thus H1 and H2 are not sup-
ported. However, in support of H3, total perceived value
is positively and significantly related to the intention for
transgenerational control (p < 0005).
The results for the German sample in Model 3 are
generally consistent with the results for Model 1 in the
Swiss sample. The adjusted R2 is 0.469, and the model
is significant (p < 00001). Cash flow (p < 00001), past
performance (p < 00001), firm size (p < 00001), the con-
struction industry control (p < 0001), and investment risk
(p < 0005) are all positively and significantly related to
the total perceived value of the firm. Model 4 includes
the independent variables. The adjusted R2 increases to
0.550 (p < 00001), and similar to the Swiss sample, the
signs and significances of the control variables gener-
ally remain stable. However, H1 is not supported; there
is no relationship between the extent of family owner-
ship and total perceived value. On the other hand, H2 is
weakly supported; there is a marginal positive relation-
ship between duration of family ownership and total per-
ceived value (p < 0010). Finally, H3 is again supported.
There is a significant and positive relationship between
the intention for transgenerational control and the total
perceived value attached to the firm by the family CEO
(p < 0001).6
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Table 4 Results of Regression Analysis for Acceptable Sale Price: Swiss Sample
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Endogeneity test
Controls
Free cash flow 00286∗∗ 00250∗∗ 00256∗∗
Past performance 00136 00124 00136
Ln firm size (employees) 00377∗∗∗ 00377∗∗∗ 00382∗∗∗
Industry dummy 1 (construction) −00016 −00030 −00020
Industry dummy 2 (service) 00216∗ 00191∗ 00176†
Investment risk 00199∗ 00162† 00163†
Private benefits −00153† −00159† −00135
CEO age 00032 00039 00044
Independent variables
Family ownership 00118 00109
Duration of family ownership/firm age −00023 −00009
Transgenerational control intentions 00174∗ 00179∗
R2 00548 00586 00589
Adjusted R2 00499 00521 00524
ãR2 00038†
F 110075∗∗∗ 90016∗∗∗ 90118∗∗∗
Notes. Standardized regression weights are shown. N = 82.
aReestimated variable using three instruments.
†p < 0010; ∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001.
Table 5 Results of Regression Analysis for Acceptable Sale Price: German Sample
Variables Model 3 Model 4 Endogeneity test
Controls
Current cash flow 00339∗∗∗ 00356∗∗∗ 00348∗∗∗
Past performance 00300∗∗∗ 00311∗∗∗ 00296∗∗∗
Ln firm size (employees) 00343∗∗∗ 00312∗∗∗ 00295∗∗∗
Industry dummy 1 (construction) 00183∗∗ 00182∗∗ 00190∗∗
Industry dummy 2 (service) 00045 00067 00080
Investment risk 00131∗ 00098 00109
Ln private benefits 00047 00024 00051
CEO age −00099 −00095 −00085
Independent variables
Family ownership 00003 −00015
Duration of family ownership/firm age 00123† 00124†
Transgenerational control intentions 00167∗∗ 00205∗∗∗a
R2 00498 00550 00562
Adjusted R2 00469 00514 00527
ãR2 00052∗∗
F 170220∗∗∗ 150117∗∗∗ 150869∗∗∗
Notes. Standardized regression weights are shown. N = 148.
aReestimated variable using three instruments.
†p < 0010; ∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001.
Robustness Tests
To supplement our analysis, we checked for the pos-
sibility of endogeneity between our independent and
dependent variables (e.g., Hamilton and Nickerson 2003)
using three instrumental variables in a two-stage least
squares regression. In the first step, the three instruments
were used to estimate our determinant of family-oriented,
socioemotional wealth, transgenerational control inten-
tions. Because identical constructs were not available
across the two studies, we used slightly different instru-
ments: pride in the family firm, status in the community,
and family harmony as instruments for the Swiss sample;
and family involvement in the business, status in the com-
munity, and family harmony as instruments for the Ger-
man sample.7 The respective results reported in Tables 4
and 5 show that the reestimated transgenerational control
intentions variable remained significant in the predicted
direction (German sample,  = 00205, p < 00001; Swiss
sample, = 00179, p < 0005), suggesting that endogene-
ity is not a problem in either sample.
Besides testing for endogeneity, we ran robustness
checks to ensure that our results are not artifacts of the
variables used in the study. The relationships found in
our primary analysis held when CEO ownership (average
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CEO ownership, 56.4%) instead of family ownership, and
organizational tenure instead of CEO age, were used in
the Swiss sample. Furthermore, as mentioned above, our
results were also confirmed when we used a three-item
measure of intentions for transgenerational control in the
German sample. In addition, the results did not change
after three additional items assessing growth in profitabil-
ity, return on total assets, and profit margin on sales were
included in our performance control variable, or when
the number of family members was added to the German
sample.
Finally, for the German sample, we compared owners’
assessments of the minimum acceptable price at which
they would be willing to sell the firm to family mem-
bers and nonfamily buyers. We found that owners would
be willing to sell the firm to family members for 22%
less (standard deviation, 34%) than they would be will-
ing to sell it to an external party (p < 00001). We then
reran our regression analysis of Model 4, using the min-
imum acceptable sales price at which owners would be
willing to sell the company’s equity to family members
as the dependent variable. As expected, there is no sig-
nificant relationship between the extent of family own-
ership, duration of family ownership, or intention for
transgenerational control and the acceptable sales price
for selling to family members. This finding indicates
that in selling the firm to family members, a perceived
need to be compensated for a loss of socioemotional
wealth did not influence valuations because an intrafam-
ily sale would preserve most, if not all, of the socio-
emotional wealth owners attach to the firm. In summary,
both of these final robustness tests are consistent with
our theoretical assertions that an acceptable selling price
when selling to nonfamily members will be substantially
higher than when selling to family members owing to the
need to extract a socioemotional wealth premium from
nonfamily buyers to compensate for the loss of family
control of the firm.
Discussion and Conclusions
Invoking the endowment effect of prospect theory
(Samuelson and Zeckhauer 1988, Thaler 1980) and the
concept of socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al. 2010;
Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007, 2010), we hypothesized that
the socioemotional wealth of a family firm increases
with the extent of a family’s ownership control, the
duration of control, and intentions for transgenerational
control. The hypotheses were tested using samples of
CEOs of family firms in Switzerland and in Germany.
The results show that the extent of control (H1) has no
relationship with perceived total value, whereas duration
of control (H2) has a mixed relationship (insignificant
in the Swiss sample but marginally significant in the
German sample), suggesting that duration of control may
have a weakly positive effect on socioemotional wealth.
Our sample was composed entirely of firms in which
the family held majority ownership (a mean of 87.9%
for the Swiss sample and a mean of 86.8% for the
German sample). Thus, it is possible that ownership has
a kinked threshold effect on socioemotional wealth. In
other words, controlling ownership by a family may
increase socioemotional wealth up to the threshold own-
ership percentage, but beyond that threshold, additional
ownership no longer does so. If true, then a significant
relationship between the extent of current ownership
and perceived total value may be observable only when
comparing family and nonfamily firms (e.g., Gómez-
Mejía et al. 2007, 2010) or when comparing family firms
with a wider ownership range than the ones in our two
samples.
The findings with regard to duration of control differ
from those of Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007), who found
that among the owners of Spanish olive oil mills, the
willingness to cede control by joining a co-op increased
(but remained significantly negative) as the firm pro-
gressed from the earlier to later stages of ownership and
management development. Their findings thus suggest
that socioemotional wealth decreases as the family firm
moves through the stages of development, whereas our
findings suggest that the relationship between duration
and total perceived value of a firm is either insignifi-
cant or positive. Aside from differences in samples (ours
were composed of firms that were generally older and
invariably family managed) and measures (we measured
age rather than stage of development), we believe that
the disparity in findings could be a function of the dif-
ferences in the decisions to join a co-op and sell the
firm outright. In the former, the family must give up
much of its discretion in governing and managing the
firm but not its involvement in ownership or manage-
ment. Therefore, the family would not necessarily lose
all of its socioemotional wealth. However, if the family
decides to sell the firm, it must completely relinquish
ownership and potentially its involvement in manage-
ment or governance. Thus, our study focused on situa-
tions where the entire socioemotional wealth endowment
would be forfeited. Taken together, these findings sug-
gest that giving up a portion of socioemotional wealth
may be viewed in an entirely different way than giv-
ing up all of that wealth. Furthermore, as family firms
move beyond the founding generation, some components
of socioemotional wealth may lose their value, whereas
others may increase in value. Research that would help
identify these nuances would be useful because the rel-
ative importance of different sources of socioemotional
wealth could influence decision making.
Our results suggest that intentions for transgenera-
tional control have a significantly positive impact on the
total perceived value of the firm and, by implication,
the socioemotional wealth of family owners (H3). This
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finding is important for several reasons. First, the lit-
erature has generally assumed that current family con-
trol through ownership of the firm is a sufficient rea-
son for the family to create and preserve socioemotional
wealth (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007, 2010; Zellweger
and Astrachan 2008). Our results call the aforemen-
tioned assumption into question by showing that socio-
emotional wealth is most strongly associated with inten-
tions for transgenerational control. We have argued that
this is because intentions for transgenerational control
are directly tied to the vision of how the firm and the
family intend to create socioemotional value in the long
run, for example, by establishing a dynasty; ensuring
long-term family influence; and maintaining the fam-
ily’s identity, reputation, and social status past the cur-
rent generation. Without such a vision, the firm is likely
to be perceived as an expendable economic instrument
rather than a family institution (cf. Selznick 1957) and
less likely to behave differently from nonfamily firms.
Second, the family business literature has not con-
ceptualized the possible relationship between socioemo-
tional wealth and intentions for transgenerational control
in attempts to explain the differences between family
and nonfamily firms, as well as variations among family
firms. Our results suggest that transgenerational con-
trol intentions influence socioemotional wealth consid-
erations. Therefore, the two are complementary rather
than alternative explanations.
Third, our results also have important implications for
family business succession. Given that transgenerational
control appears to be strongly related to socioemotional
wealth, it is not surprising that succession is consid-
ered the most important issue by family business man-
agers and has been the most frequently studied topic
in the family literature (Chua et al. 2003). Furthermore,
if intentions for transgenerational control influence per-
ceptions of the total perceived value of the firm, family
owners may price their firms out of the market when
succession is feasible and seen as desirable. This could
help explain why successors who are obviously lacking
in capability are still appointed, thereby putting the fam-
ily’s future financial and socioemotional wealth at risk;
those family owners are apparently willing to accept the
risks to both sources of wealth rather than sacrificing the
endowed socioemotional wealth associated with appoint-
ing a family successor. Again, family owners appear to
be loss averse when it comes to decisions that affect
their socioemotional wealth.
Finally, if intention for transgenerational control is
related to socioemotional wealth and varies among fam-
ily firms, it may also help explain why some family
managers act as stewards and others act as agents (e.g.,
Chrisman et al. 2004, Eddleston and Kellermanns 2007).
For example, if owners wish to pass their firms on to
future generations, they are likely to be more mindful of
the type of organization they leave behind and less likely
to pursue policies that put the firm in an unviable strate-
gic position. Thus, the so-called long-term orientation of
family firms may be directly related to whether intrafam-
ily succession is desired (James 1999). Although these
relationships seem implicit in the family business lit-
erature, we are unaware of studies that have directly
tested them. Given that family firms are heterogeneous
(Melin and Nordqvist 2007), testing these conjectures
could assist in explaining some of the heterogeneity.
Limitations
Before discussing implications for research, we need to
discuss the principal limitations of this study. First, both
our conceptual development and empirical methodology
examined family control and total perceived value of
the firm at the individual level using the owner-CEO as
our key informant. Because the difference between the
total perceived value and the actual financial value of the
firm is assumed to be a consequence of the endowment
effect induced by control, it is important to note that the
endowment effect at the group or family level may be
stronger or different (e.g., Blumenthal 2009, Galin et al.
2006). Therefore, care should be taken in extrapolating
our results and conclusions to the family group level.
Second, it is important to note that the total perceived
value of the family firm according to the family owner-
CEO will likely not be the firm’s actual selling price.
However, to achieve our purpose, we did not need an
exact measure of the selling price; instead, we only
needed to show that control (particularly, the intention
for transgenerational control) is a significant driver of the
total perceived value of the firm after accounting for the
financial and other nonfinancial influences common to
family and nonfamily firms. That purpose was achieved
in this study. Indeed, the post hoc tests for the German
sample provide further support for our main results by
showing that the price at which family owners would
sell the firm to an outsider was higher than the price
they would demand from a buyer within the family. Fur-
thermore, consistent with the notion that socioemotional
wealth is preserved when control of the firm remains
in family hands, our measures of family control did not
influence the acceptable selling price to family mem-
bers. Together, these robustness tests suggest that the
difference in acceptable selling prices is the result of an
endowment premium family owners require to compen-
sate for a loss of socioemotional wealth when selling to
nonfamily buyers.
Third, our study utilized a cross-sectional design;
therefore, although endogeneity does not appear to be a
problem, we cannot demonstrate causality. Fourth, our
response rates were low, and we relied largely on sin-
gle respondents for our data. Thus, the potential for
nonresponse bias and common method bias still exists
despite test results to the contrary. However, because we
conducted two separate studies that yielded consistent
Zellweger et al.: Family Control and Family Firm Valuation by Family CEOs
Organization Science 23(3), pp. 851–868, © 2012 INFORMS 863
conclusions, the possibilities of biases are reduced. Fur-
thermore, for bias to occur it would be necessary for
responses to the questions about both transgenerational
control and selling price to have been affected by a third
variable, because a tendency to systematically respond
higher or lower to either variable alone would have not
affected our findings. This is because support for our
hypotheses depended on the relationship between family
control and total perceived value, rather than the amount
by which the total perceived value diverged from the
true financial value of the firm. However, our endogene-
ity analysis suggests that omitted variable bias is not a
concern, and our other analyses suggest no differences
between respondents and nonrespondents on the vari-
ables of interest. With regard to the possibility of com-
mon method bias, the comparison of data collected from
other sources with the data used in this study provides
further assurance of the reliability and validity of our
findings.
Fifth, we also need to mention that a CEO-owner’s
assessment of a firm’s total perceived value may be
influenced by market forces. Although we controlled for
industry effects and measured perceived value in two
different time frames with no apparent impact on our
findings, we encourage future studies to account more
fully for industry effects and for the market attractive-
ness of mergers and acquisitions.
Sixth, it is impossible to say that all factors unrelated
to socioemotional value have been fully accounted for
by the control variables. Our study has included what
the literature considers the most important, and, as noted
above, our hypothesis tests required only that the total
perceived value is significantly affected by the different
aspects of ownership control. Nevertheless, there may be
situations where imprecision could affect the interpreta-
tion of the results with regard to the extent of current
ownership (H1). For example, family managers, includ-
ing the CEO, may be paid more by the family firm than
what the external labor market would pay, and this could
influence firm valuations. But the overpayment of under-
qualified family managers appears to be a function of
altruism (Chua et al. 2009); if so, it should be considered
part of socioemotional value. On the other hand, the tal-
ents of family managers might instead be discounted by
the external labor market (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2003, Wu
et al. 2004) because of an inability to ascertain the mix
of performance and family ties that gave them their posi-
tions. In this situation the family manager is not over-
paid according to performance but is still paid more than
what the external labor market would pay, owing to the
family’s superior ability to resolve information asymme-
tries regarding the family manager’s ability and effort
(Wu et al. 2004). Although theory has not specifically
addressed this issue, we tend to believe that the fam-
ily’s ability to resolve information asymmetries of this
type is part of socioemotional value because the effort to
do so represents a discharge of an obligation to family
members whose talents are undervalued by the external
labor market. In either of these cases, our interpretation
of results should be unaffected. However, if the employ-
ment and compensation benefit is instead common to
family and nonfamily firms with concentrated ownership
(Chrisman et al. 2005, Combs et al. 2010), then future
studies should more fully take that aspect of private ben-
efits into account.
Seventh, in a similar vein, our measures of private
benefits did not differentiate between economic benefits
that may be available exclusively to family owners or
managers and those that may be more broadly available
to all executives (Astrachan and Jaskiewicz 2008). This
issue is perhaps more relevant in the German sample
where we measure a specific but not comprehensive set
of private benefits. As discussed above, however, any
omission would cause a problem only if the observed
relationships are due to factors not captured by the con-
trol variable for private benefits. Because all the fam-
ilies in our samples held majority ownership and had
equal discretion to engage in such practices, the thres-
hold effect noted previously is likely to hold; therefore,
the potential for these factors to affect the relationship
between the amount of ownership and total perceived
value of the firm appears small. Indeed, our tests for
endogeneity suggest that omitted factors did not influ-
ence our results. Nevertheless, future studies are encour-
aged to develop more fine-grained measurements of pri-
vate benefits to more fully capture their extent and types,
as well as those that are uniquely available to family
members.
Finally, our two samples were composed of firms
located in Switzerland and Germany, which may have
important cultural differences from firms in the United
States and other nations (Hofstede 2001). Business prac-
tices between Europe and the United States have become
more comparable (Carr 2005), but more research is
needed before we can be confident of the generalizabil-
ity of our findings.
Future Research
Aside from attempting to overcome the limitations of
our study by conducting longitudinal research, obtain-
ing data from multiple sources, using finer-grained mea-
sures, and confirming or refuting our findings with larger
samples and in different cultural settings, there are a
number of fruitful directions future research might take.
First, because endowment effects may also occur in non-
family settings where attachments to an organization
develop (Kahneman et al. 1991), further research should
more fully specify other contextual factors beyond mea-
sures of family control that promote the development
of socioemotional wealth in family firms. Comparative
studies about the importance of demographic factors
such as CEO tenure, number of potential successors,
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gender, and ethnicity may also provide insights to enrich
our knowledge of family firms. Furthermore, social iden-
tity theory might enrich our understanding of the value
premium of ownership in family firms (Ashforth et al.
2008, Milton 2008). Family owners may value continued
control of the firm because of their identification with
both the firm and the family, and this might have both
positive and negative consequences.
Second, more research on how the intention for trans-
generational control affects family firm decision making
is needed. For example, aside from affecting the total
perceived value of the firm, transgenerational control
intentions may influence the willingness to take strate-
gic risks (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007, 2010), shed individ-
ual assets (Sharma and Manikutty 2005), and institute
professional management practices (Chua et al. 2009,
Gedajlovic et al. 2004) and goals (Chrisman et al. 2012).
Third, although we have shown that intention for
transgenerational control is an important driver of
socioemotional wealth, more nuanced investigations of
the components of socioemotional wealth and how
the importance of those components influences deci-
sion making in the firm are necessary. For example,
the importance of legacy, values, social capital, altru-
ism, reputation, and harmony may vary across families,
and differences in the priorities families place on these
sources of socioemotional wealth are likely to lead to
very different sets of firm behaviors and performance
outcomes.
Fourth, in defining socioemotional wealth, researchers
typically include a long list of benefits, some of which
are available through current control and some that are
mainly related to intentions for transgenerational control.
Our results show that intentions for transgenerational
control as an aspect of control has the most impor-
tant impact on socioemotional value. By implication,
this suggests that the different types of benefits typically
included in definitions of socioemotional wealth may
have different values to the controlling family. Future
research should investigate whether this is the case and,
if so, what the family and business characteristics that
affect the valuation of the benefits are.
Finally, we hope that our application of prospect the-
ory (Kahneman et al. 1991, Kahneman and Lovallo
1993, Kahneman and Tversky 1979b, Tversky and
Kahneman 1974) will inspire additional applications.
For example, the isolation effect in prospect theory
implies a tendency to judge the risks of each situa-
tion individually rather than in the context of the firm’s
other activities (Kahneman and Lovallo 1993). For fam-
ily firms, intentions for transgenerational control might
exacerbate the isolation effect by, for example, causing
owners to fail to appreciate the risks of appointing a less
competent eldest son to a managerial post despite the
preferences of other family members for appointing the
more competent younger daughter, or of pursuing a cor-
porate venturing initiative because it fits the skills of a
particular family member who wishes autonomy without
regard to the overall reputation of the firm. Without con-
sidering the bigger picture, the potential impact of such
decisions might be misunderstood. In other words, the
isolation effect might cause family owners to focus on
one aspect of their socioemotional wealth to the detri-
ment of other sources of socioemotional wealth, not
to mention the future performance and sustainability of
the firm.
Implications for Practice
For practitioners, our findings indicate that family firms
may be particularly difficult to sell or buy when own-
ers maintain intentions to pass control on to future
generations of the family. Indeed, adding one incre-
ment of transgenerational control intentions to the mean
acceptable sales price increases the total perceived value
of the firm by EUR 1,082,626 (18.2% of mean sales
price of EUR 5,956,538) for the German sample and
CHF 1,847,901 (19.0% of mean sales price of CHF
9,722,953) for the Swiss sample.8 Therefore, due dili-
gence on the part of buyers is particularly important in
the purchase of a family firm because sellers are likely to
systematically overvalue it compared to a strictly finan-
cial valuation when transgenerational control is possible
and desirable. A complex iterative bidding process may
be necessary to achieve convergence in price between
the seller of the family firm and the potential buyer
(Coursey et al. 1987). Appraisals from independent out-
siders may be another alternative.
Given that intentions for transgenerational control can
materially influence negotiations between buyers and
sellers, practitioners should also be aware that the non-
financial terms of the deal may be as important as
the financial terms. For example, providing continued
employment to key family and nonfamily members and
otherwise preserving aspects of the family legacy might
be used as levers of negotiation for the benefit (or ill)
of one or both parties (e.g., Howorth et al. 2004). Such
concessions might become particularly important if the
possibility of selling increases the interest of previously
uninvolved family members in the firm, because this
might provide options for retaining family control that
were previously unavailable. As our study shows, this is
likely to alter the socioemotional wealth premium own-
ers will demand to sell the firm. In short, our findings
take a step toward providing a better understanding of
the difficulties associated with transitions of corporate
control in family firms.
In conclusion, the results of our study suggest that
the extent of current control has no impact on the total
perceived value of the firm, and the duration of control
has only a mixed impact. On the other hand, inten-
tions for transgenerational control had a significant, pos-
itive impact in both samples. These results suggest that
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although family control of a firm is necessary for socio-
emotional wealth to accrue to the family, intentions for
transgenerational control appear best able to explain the
variations in socioemotional wealth endowments among
family firms. These results provide insights into the role
and meaning of family firms to their owners and help
us understand why some family firms exhibit behaviors
that differ substantially from nonfamily firms and why
others do not.
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Endnotes
1Family owners should not lose all of their socioemotional
wealth if the firm is sold to a family member. Therefore, this
relationship does not hold when the sale is to a family member.
This is discussed further and demonstrated empirically in the
Robustness Tests section.
2There should be no bias associated with the source of that
sample because the accounting firm worked for less than 3%
of the family firms on the mailing list.
3For example, in most small and midsized family firms in
Switzerland, the CEO is also the president of the governance
board, which further supports our approach to use the CEO as
our key informant.
4In a post hoc analysis to test the robustness of our findings,
we improved the construct by adding a third item that was
available for the German sample: “Having family traditions
carried on [to the next generation] is an important aspect of
our work” ( = 0085). The results were consistent regardless
of how the transgenerational control intention variable was
operationalized.
5In practice, private firms seem to rely on multiples of cash
flow, earnings, sales, and book value of investments to deter-
mine financial value rather than on complex calculations of net
present values (Dahl 2008). Therefore, our financial control
variables appear reasonable for the purpose of this research.
6We found no significant relationship between the private ben-
efits of controlling ownership and total perceived value in the
regressions for either sample, and this deserves a brief dis-
cussion. Although the lack of a relationship between these
variables does not affect our principal findings, financial the-
ory and evidence from large public companies suggest that
the relationship should be significant and positive. The non-
significant relationships found in this study may be a conse-
quence of the high levels of ownership concentration among
the small and medium-sized firms we studied. Thus, the aver-
age family ownership in both samples used in this study was
approximately 87%. Therefore, extraction of private benefits
would likely not benefit the owner and the family substan-
tially because they would bear almost the full cost of those
benefits. This is in contrast to the case of large public firms,
where control is achieved with a much lower ownership stake
(e.g., Villalonga and Amit 2006). In that situation, the cost to
the controlling owners is a small fraction of the loss of profits
caused by the private benefits that they alone consume.
7The instruments used in the endogeneity tests capture aspects
of socioemotional wealth identified by Gómez-Mejía et al.
(2007, 2010). We asked respondents about their level of agree-
ment with statements such as “The family is proud to be
involved in the firm” (pride), “The family derives status in the
community from business ownership” (status in the commu-
nity), “Within the business family we have harmony” (family
harmony), and “The family is strongly involved in the busi-
ness” (family involvement).
8The exchange rate at the time of study for the Swiss sample
was USD 0.82/CHF 1; for the German sample, it was USD
1.32/EUR 1.
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